On Civil Resistance and The Right to Bear Arms

I have been reading a book, loaned to me by a pacifist friend, entitled, “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.” Before I dig in, I will give you an introduction to the material and some of the key concepts outlined by the authors, Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan. The premise of the book is that nonviolent insurrection is more effective than armed struggle when citizens want change from their government. There are several factors the book argues are necessary for success:

Mass, dispersed efforts – the authors argue that armed insurrections are performed by small bands of individuals willing to use deadly force who are backed by some form of financial support, either through factions in the country of conflict or through outside funding. They suggest that barriers to participation are high because ordinary citizens in many countries lack the skills, resources or willingness to participate in armed struggle. On the other hand, for the most part, attending a protest is a low barrier activity in contrast to armed resistance. The authors suggest that these efforts should be “dispersed” through a broad network. The authors mention using social media and mobile technologies to manage information across broad, grassroots networks. In their research they state that attempts to topple a government through the intervention of factions with strong leadership may fail due to power struggles among faction leaders.

Coercive force and media intervention – throughout the book, the authors highlight how media impressions, both through the amount of coverage, and the attitude about those countering the government, influence outcomes. They suggest that coercive force is absolutely necessary to create change in an unwilling leader. Armed insurrections reduce the insurgent’s power because they become complicit in bloodshed. Mass movements, on the other hand, evoke international response. Images of monks, laborers and the general masses being shot or beaten bring human rights groups and political power to the equation. Taking on victim status generates power – so long as there is coverage and someone with power to feel the protester’s pain.

Creating loyalty shifts within the government – a key to success, the authors indicate, is to move members of the existing power structure to the protester’s cause. With armed conflict, they argue, this is less likely, because groups entrench against their opposition. If their lives are in danger, they must fight or flee. Flight is an unlikely response from a group that holds power. In contrast, when the opposition uses nonviolence, it is more likely that some members within the government will have ethical qualms about excessive force, or that they will relate to some messages presented by the opposition.

A Complex Field of Contestation

The authors present several case studies that highlight the complexity of any political uprising. They describe the Iranian uprising against the Shah in 1979 as a partial success. The Shah was overthrown, but democratic groups that participated heavily in nonviolent protests to advocate for women’s rights, education, and liberalization of law were ejected from the decision process as a new Islamic religious government was established. The concept of democracy was exploited for another, more sinister purpose.

Another, more positive case study covers the 1986 Philippine ouster of Ferdinand Marcos for a new democratic government. The case demonstrates how mass movements and grass-roots organizing turned factions within the military against Marcos, leading to his removal from government and then to democratic elections. The case highlights the stabilizing force that the Catholic Church played in organizing anti-regime protests.

Evaluating the Cases from the Book

I find it a little disgusting to count the Iranian revolution as a success on any level. Citizen effort was exploited for other’s advantage. One tyrannical government was overturned for another. To count that as partial success, to me, seems like kowtowing to ideological thinking. The authors will bend over backwards to call a new tyrannical government a success if it manipulated peaceful protesters to do their dirty work for them.

In mass protests in the United States I have observed how interest groups utilize and leverage mass movements for their position. Anti-Iraq war protests in Portland, Oregon had groups such as anti-semites press anti-Israel, anarchists press anti-globalization, unions press anti-business and anti-enforcement on immigration policy. The war was the best thing that had happened for these fringe groups in a long time.

From my own observation it is hard to see this process as “working.” Occupy Wall Street encampments resulted in hot-spots for petty crime, like theft, drug related offenses, and felonies such as sexual assault. I’m hesitant to call this activity “working” to create something better.

In evaluating the case of the Philippine uprising, I suggest that the underlying mindset and grounding of opposition leaders in normative, stabilizing cultures such as long-standing religious traditions, in contrast to groups whose core objective is to destabilize culture (anarchists, adbusters affiliates, anti-semites, and occupyers).

The connection or lack thereof to campaign success based on a movement’s grounding in longstanding cultural institutions is something that is not investigated by the authors.

What Constitutes Sufficiency for the Public to Rise Up?

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