In a recent article published on the website of the Brookings Institution, 30 year CIA veteran and current Brookings senior fellow, Bruce Riedel talks false flag ops in relation to Algerian counter-terrorism units. In his article¬†Algeria a Complex Ally in War Against al Qaeda, Riedel gives a description of the Algerian counter-terrorism unit DRS and its methods:
‚Äú(The) DRS is (‚Ä¶) known for its tactic of infiltrating terrorist groups, creating ‚Äúfalse flag‚ÄĚ terrorists and trying to control them.‚ÄĚ, Riedel writes. ‚ÄúRumors have associated the DRS in the past with the Malian warlord Iyad Ag Ghali, head of Ansar al Dine AQIM‚Äôs ally in Mali, and even with Mukhtar Belmukhtar, the al-Qaeda terrorist who engineered the attack on the natural gas plant.‚ÄĚ
Here the CIA-vet admits that the Algerian intelligence agency is in the business of ‚Äúcreating false flag terrorists‚ÄĚ, and that this agency is ‚Äúrumored‚ÄĚ to have ties to terrorist attacks in North Africa. This statement is quite interesting, as the very concept of ‚Äúfalse flag‚ÄĚ is usually labeled as some outrageous conspiracy theory. We of course know that false flag terrorism is standard modus operandi of intelligence agencies all over the world. We are also aware of the fact that the Brookings Institution is one of the think tanks that warm to the idea of using false flag attacks to attain public support for an invasion of Iran.
In the 2009 paper, the authors openly contemplated a possible ‚Äúprovocation‚ÄĚ to escalate things to the point of armed conflict:
‚Äú(‚Ä¶) it is not impossible‚ÄĚ, they write, ‚Äúthat Tehran might take some action that would justify an American invasion. And it is certainly the case that if Washington sought such a provocation, it could take actions that might make it more likely that Tehran would do so (although being too obvious about this could nullify the provocation). However, since it would be up to Iran to make the provocation move (‚Ä¶), the United States would never know for sure when it would get the requisite Iranian provocation. In fact, it might never come at all.‚ÄĚ
Under the headline ‚ÄúThe Question of a Provocation‚ÄĚ on page 66 in this document, the authors press the point even further:
‚ÄėWith provocation, the international diplomatic and domestic political requirements of an invasion would be mitigated, and the more outrageous the Iranian provocation (and the less that the United States is seen to be goading Iran), the more these challenges would be diminished. In the absence of a sufficiently horrific provocation, meeting these requirements would be daunting.‚ÄĚ
Reminiscent of the Pearl Harbor-quote by raving neocons pre-9/11, the authors continue imagining how excellent it would be to have an Iranian-sponsored terror attack within the US to trigger war and march off toward Iran. During all this, the authors are aware how unlikely it is that Iran would actually commit such an attack on American soil (probably because they know which party is usually responsible for such mass terror attacks):
‚ÄúSomething on the order of an Iranian-backed 9/11, in which the plane wore Iranian markings and Tehran boasted about its sponsorship.(‚Ä¶). The entire question of ‚Äúoptions‚ÄĚ become irrelevant at that point: what American president could refrain from an invasion after the Iranians had just killed several thousand American civilians in an attack in the United States itself?‚ÄĚ
Regarding the question of international support for an US invasion of the Islamic Republic, the Brookings people lament:
‚ÄúOther than a Tehran-sponsored 9/11, it is hard to imagine what would change their minds.‚ÄĚ
The same goes for their plans in regards to that old favorite of the elite, covert psychological warfare in order to subdue a sovereign nation. In chapter 7 of the manuscript, called ‚ÄúInspiring an Insurgency‚ÄĚ, it examines the possibility of propagandizing the Iranian people into helping out the globalists plunder their nation:
‚ÄúThe core concept lying at the heart of this option would be for the United States to identify one or more Iranian opposition groups and support them as it did other insurgencies in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Kurdistan, Angola, and dozens of other locales since the Second World War. The United States would provide arms, money, training, and organizational assistance to help the groups develop and extend their reach. U.S. media and propaganda outlets could highlight group grievances and showcase rival leaders.‚ÄĚ
The entire Arab Spring hoax springs to mind, doesn‚Äôt it? As Paul Joseph Watson¬†reported¬†in September of 2012, a member of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) think tank proposed a false flag operation to kick off a military conflict with the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The think tank‚Äôs director of research Patrick Clawson stated:
‚Äú(‚Ä¶) if (‚Ä¶) the Iranians aren‚Äôt going to compromise, it would be best if somebody else started the war,‚ÄĚ Clawson said.